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Abstract
We study minimum cost spanning tree problems and deﬁne a cost
sharing rule that satisﬁes many more properties than other rules in
the literature. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization
based on monotonicity properties.
1 Introduction
Many problems involving network formation have been studied in operations
research and economics literature. Two particular issues have been exten-
sively explored in operations research, namely eﬃcient algorithm designs and
computational complexity, whereas the economic literature focuses on aspects
such as cost sharing within networks and the design of mechanisms which
attempt to explain how networks are formed.
I nt h i sp a p e rw ef o c u so nt h ec o s ts h a r i n ga s p e c t . O u rc o n t r i b u t i o n
can be considered against the background of the well-known literature on
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1cost allocation. We assume that there are no external forces (for example,
the market) which determine ﬁnal allocation. Agreements can be reached
directly between individual agents, or indirectly by leaving the ﬁnal decision
to a neutral referee. In both cases the important issue is to achieve a "fair
allocation" of cost.
In particular we study minimum cost spanning tree problems (mcstp).
Consider a group of agents located at diﬀerent geographical points who want
some particular service which can only be provided by a common supplier,
called the source. Agents will be served through connections which entail
some cost. However, they do not care whether they are connected directly
or indirectly to the source.
There are many economic situations that can be modeled in this way.
For instance, several towns may draw power from a common power plant,
and hence have to share the cost of the distribution network. This example
appears in Dutta and Kar (2004). Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2004) studied
a real situation where villagers had to pay the cost of constructing pipes
from their respective houses to a water supplier. Other examples include
communication networks, such as telephone, Internet, or cable television.
The literature on mcstp starts by deﬁning algorithms for constructing
minimal cost spanning trees (mt). We can mention, for instance, the papers
of Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957). However, constructing an mt is only
part of the problem. Another important issue is how to allocate the cost
associated with mt among agents.
Bird (1976) associated a cooperative game with any mcstp.M o r e o v e r ,f o r
cases when the mcstp has a single mt, Bird proposed a rule called the Bird
r u l e .G r a n o ta n dH u b e r m a n( 1 9 8 1 ,1 9 8 4 )s t u d i e dt h ec o r ea n dt h en u c l e o l u s
of this cooperative game. Sharkey (1995) has surveyed most of this literature.
More recently, Kar (2002) studied the corresponding Shapley value (which
we denote as K); Dutta and Kar (2004) extended the Bird rule to more than
one mt (an extension we denote as B), and proposed a new rule (which we
denote as DK).
We will now discuss the allocation proposed by K, B,a n dDK in a very
simple example. The ﬁrst non-trivial case in mcstp occurs when two agents
wish to be connected to the source and the optimal choice is for one of the
agents to connect through the other. The following example describes a
particular case of such a situation.
Example 1.1 There are two agents. The connection cost between agent 1
and the source is 10, between agent 1 and 2 is 2, and between agent 2 and
the source is 10 + x,w h e r ex ≥ 0. This situation can be represented by the
2following ﬁgure:
where 0 is the source.
If x =0 , the agents are symmetric. The three rules propose symmetric
allocation (6,6).
If x>0, the agents are asymmetric. The unique mt is {(0,1),(1,2)}.
We can proceed in one of two ways. First of all, we can ignore x because
the arc (0,2) will not be constructed. Hence, (6,6) is still valid. Secondly,
since the problem is asymmetric we can use the information provided by x.
Hence, (6,6) is wrong.
The three rules proceed according to the second alternative. The following
table shows the allocation proposed by each of the rules when x>0:
Agent 1 Agent 2
B 10 2
DK 21 0
K 6 − x
2 6+x
2
B and DK propose the same allocation independently of x (as long as
x>0). Moreover, minor changes in the cost of the arc (0,2) produce major
changes in the proposal. We consider this to be unfair, and claim that the
rule should be a continuous function of the cost.
K is a continuous function of the cost. However, if we take x =1 0 0 ,t h e n
K =( −44,56). This means that agent 2 pays 44 units to agent 1 in addition
to the cost of the network. Again, we believe that this allocation is unfair.
We claim that the rule should be positive, i.e. agents should not make a
proﬁt on the transaction.
Our conclusion, in Example 1.1, is that (6,6) is a better allocation than
those proposed by K, B,a n dDK, even when the problem is asymmetric.
Note that (6,6) can be obtained through a two-stage procedure. First of all,
w ea r g u et h a tw h e nx>0, the allocation should coincide with the allocation
when x =0 . Secondly, we argue that (6,6) is the correct allocation when
x =0 .
Something similar happens with bargaining problems. Consider the bar-
gaining problems (d,S) and (d,S0) where d =( 0 ,0),S= {(x1,x 2):x1 + x2 ≤ 1},
and S0 = {(x1,x 2):x1 + x2 ≤ 1 and x1 ≤ 0.5}.E v e nt h o u g hb o t hp r o b l e m s
3are diﬀerent — because of the property of independence of irrelevant alterna-
t i v e s—t h eN a s hs o l u t i o nt ob o t hp r o b l e m si s(0.5,0.5).I nE x a m p l e1 . 1w e
consider x to be irrelevant.
I nt h i sp a p e rw eg e n e r a l i z et h i si d e at ot h ee n t i r ec l a s so fmcstp.G i v e n
an mcstp modelled by a matrix C,w eﬁrst associate a matrix C∗ with C; sec-
ondly, we compute an allocation in C∗; and thirdly, we deﬁne the allocation
in C as the allocation obtained in C∗.
Take an mcstp deﬁned through a matrix C.G i v e na nmt t, Bird (1976)
deﬁned the minimal network associated with C and t. It is known that this
minimal network does not depend on the chosen mt. Hence, it makes sense
to deﬁne the matrix C∗,r e f e r r e dt oa sa nirreducible matrix,a st h em i n i m a l
network associated with some mt t.
We introduce a procedure to associate a corresponding irreducible matrix
C∗ with each arbitrary matrix C. In Propositions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 we present
new results regarding irreducible matrices and the procedure. These results
w i l lb ec r u c i a lt ot h er e s to ft h ep r o o f si nt h i sp a p e r .
In Proposition 3.4 we prove that B and K coincide in irreducible matrices.
Thus, we deﬁne the rule ϕ in the matrix C a st h eB i r dr u l e( o rt h eK a rr u l e )
of its irreducible matrix C∗.
Our next step is to explain why ϕ is a fair rule. We draw up a list of
"basic properties" and prove that ϕ satisﬁes many more basic properties than
the other three rules. The list of basic properties includes, from our point of
view, those properties that provide the best way to proceed with this type
of problems. For instance, assume that two agents are symmetric. The best
thing that a fair rule can do is to allocate the same cost to both agents. The
list of basic properties include properties which have already been used in
the existing literature on mcstp, and others introduced in this paper.
Our ﬁnal step is to present two characterizations of ϕ. If we restrict
ourselves to irreducible problems, ϕ is the only rule satisfying Symmetry
(SYM)a n dIndependence of Other Costs (IOC). IOC says that the amount
paid by an agent only depends on the cost of the arcs to which he belongs.
We also provide a characterization of ϕ for the entire class of mcstp.
This characterization uses Strong Cost Monotonicity (SCM), Population
Monotonicity (PM)a n dEqual Share of Extra Costs (ESEC).
SCM says that if a network connection cost increases, no agent should
pay less.
PM says that if we add new agents, no agent will be worse oﬀ.
The idea of ESEC is the following: consider a problem where the most
expensive connection cost for any agent is the cost of connecting to the source.
Moreover, the connection cost to the source is the same for all agents. Assume
that this connection cost increases x>0. ESEC says that if agent i pays fi
4in the original problem, he must pay fi + x
n when the cost increases (where
n is the number of agents).
SCM and PM are standard properties often used in economic models.
We believe that these properties are very natural and that any fair rule should
satisfy both. ESEC is a property deﬁned explicitly for mcstp.W eb e l i e v e
that it is a natural property with a clear meaning. We do not claim that
every fair rule should satisfy ESEC. However, we do see it as a property
that selects a rule from among the set of "fair rules" (rules that satisfy SCM
and PM).
Feltkamp, Tijs and Muto (1994) introduced a rule for mcstp called the
Equal Remaining Obligations rule (ERO). They introduced ERO through
Kruskal’s algorithm. In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004d) we proved that
ϕ coincides with ERO, and moreover, presented other alternative deﬁnitions
for ϕ.
This rule has been studied in other papers. Brânzei, Moretti, Norde
and Tijs (2004) and Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004a) obtained other
axiomatic characterizations of ϕ using an additivity property. On the other
hand, in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004e) we proved that ϕ is the Shapley
value of the cooperative game (N,v+) where v+ (S) r e p r e s e n t st h ec o s to f
connecting agents of S to the source and assuming that the rest of agents
are already connected. Moreover, in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b) we
proved that ϕ can be obtained as the equilibrium payoﬀ of a non-cooperative
game.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the mcstp,
along with the rules and properties considered in the paper. In Section 3
we introduce the rule ϕ and study the irreducible form of an mcstp.I n
Section 4 we study the properties satisﬁed by ϕ and provide the axiomatic
characterizations. Finally, in Section 5 we brieﬂy comment on some of the
results obtained for ϕ in other papers. Most of the proofs are in Section 6
(Appendix).
2 The minimum cost spanning tree problem
This section is divided into three subsections. In the ﬁrst subsection, we
introduce the problem. In the second subsection, we introduce some rules of
the literature, and ﬁnally, in the third subsection, we present some properties
of the rules.
52.1 The problem
Let N = {1,2,...} be the set of all possible agents. Given a ﬁnite subset
N ⊂ N,l e tΠN denote the set of all orders in N.G i v e n π ∈ ΠN,l e t
Pre(i,π) denote the set of elements of N which come before i in the order
given by π, i.e.
Pre(i,π)={j ∈ N | π(j) <π(i)}.
For notational simplicity, given π ∈ ΠN,w ed e n o t et h ea g e n ti ∈ N with
π(i)=s as πs.
We are interested in networks whose nodes are elements of a set N0 =
N ∪ {0},w h e r e0 is a special node called the source.U s u a l l yw et a k eN =
{1,...,n}. Our interest lies on networks where each node in N is (directly or
indirectly) connected to the source.
A cost matrix C =( cij)i,j∈N0 in N represents the cost of a direct link
between any pair of nodes. We assume that cij = cji ≥ 0 for all i,j ∈ N0
and that cii =0for all i ∈ N0.S i n c ecij = cji we will work with undirected
arcs, i.e. (i,j)=( j,i).
We denote the set of all cost matrices over N as CN.G i v e nC, C0 ∈ CN
we say that C ≤ C0 if cij ≤ c0
ij for all i,j ∈ N0.
A minimal cost spanning tree problem,m o r eb r i e ﬂy referred to as an
mcstp,i sap a i r(N0,C) where N ⊂ N is a ﬁnite set of agents, 0 is the
source, and C ∈ CN is the cost matrix.
A network g over N0 is a subset of {(i,j) | i,j ∈ N0}. T h ee l e m e n t so fg
are called arcs.
Given a network g and a pair of diﬀerent nodes i and j,apath from i to
j (in g) is a sequence of diﬀerent arcs {(is−1,i s)}
p
s=1 that satisfy (is−1,i s) ∈ g
for all s ∈ {1,2,...,p}, i = i0 and j = ip.W e s a y t h a t i,j ∈ N are linked
(in g) if there exists a path from i to j which does not include the source. If
(i,j) ∈ g,w es a yt h a ti and j are directly linked (in g). We say that the node
i is connected to the source (in g) if there exists a path from i to the source.
A tree is a network where there is a unique path from i to the source for
all i ∈ N.I ft is a tree, we usually write t = {(i0,i)}i∈N,w h e r ei0 represents
the ﬁr s tn o d ei nt h eu n i q u ep a t hi nt from i to the source.
We denote the set of all networks over N0 as GN and the set of networks
over N0 in such a way that every agent in N is connected to the source as
GN
0 .






6When there is no ambiguity, we write c(g) or c(C,g) instead of c(N0,C,g).
A minimum cost spanning tree for (N0,C),m o r eb r i e ﬂyr e f e r r e dt oa sa n
mt,i sat r e et ∈ GN
0 such that c(t)=m i n
g∈GN
0
c(g). It is well established in the
literature on mcstp that an mt exists, even though it does not necessarily
have to be unique. Given an mcstp (N0,C) we denote the cost associated
with any mt t in (N0,C) as m(N0,C).
Given an mcstp (N0,C),w ed e n o t et h emcstp induced by C in S ⊂ N as
(S0,C).
Bird (1976) associated a cooperative game (N,vC) with each mcstp (N0,C)
where vC (S)=m(S0,C) for each S ⊂ N.
We will now introduce some well-known results of cooperative games
which will be used throughout the paper. We introduce them considering
the cooperative game as a cost sharing problem.







xi = v(N) and
X
i∈S
xi ≤ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N
)
.
We say that (N,v) is concave if, for all S,T ⊂ N and i ∈ N such that
S ⊂ T and i/ ∈ T,
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T).







[v(Pre(i,π) ∪ {i}) − v(Pre(i,π))].
It is well-known that the Shapley value belongs to the core when the
cooperative game is concave.
2.2 Rules
One of the most important issues addressed in the literature about mcstp
is how to divide the cost of connecting agents to the source. We will now
brieﬂy introduce some of the rules studied in the literature.
A( cost allocation) rule is a function ψ such that ψ(N0,C) ∈ RN for
each mcstp (N0,C) and
P
i∈N
ψi (N0,C)=m(N0,C).A s u s u a l , ψi (N0,C)
represents the cost allocated to agent i.
7Notice that we implicitly assume that the agents build an mt.A sf a ra s
we know, all the rules proposed in the literature make this assumption.
Given an mcstp, Prim (1957) provides an algorithm for solving the prob-
lem of connecting all agents to the source such that the total cost of creating
the network is minimal. The idea of this algorithm is simple: starting from
the source we construct a network by sequentially adding arcs with the lowest
cost and without introducing cycles.
Formally, Prim’s algorithm is deﬁned as follows. We start with S0 = {0}
and g0 = ∅.
Stage 1:T a k ea na r c(0,i) such that c0i =m i n
j∈N
{c0j}. If there are several
arcs satisfying this condition, select just one. Now, S1 = {0,i} and g1 =
{(0,i)}.
Stage p +1 :A s s u m et h a tw eh a v ed e ﬁned Sp ⊂ N0 and gp ∈ GN.W e
now deﬁne Sp+1 and gp+1.T a k ea na r c(j,i) with j ∈ Sp and i ∈ N0\Sp such
that cji =m i n
k∈Sp,l∈No\Sp {ckl}. If there are several arcs satisfying this condition,
select just one. Now, Sp+1 = Sp ∪ {i} and gp+1 = gp ∪ {(j,i)}.
This process is completed in n stages. We say that gn is a tree obtained
following Prim’s algorithm. Notice that this algorithm leads to a tree, but
that this is not always unique.
We will now introduce three rules from the literature: the Bird rule, the
Kar rule, and Dutta-Kar’s rule.
The Bird rule (Bird, 1976) and Dutta-Kar’s rule (Dutta and Kar, 2004)
are deﬁned through Prim’s algorithm. We ﬁrst assume that there is a unique
mt t.
Given i ∈ N,l e ti0 be the ﬁrst node in the unique path in t from i to the
source. The Bird rule (B)i sd e ﬁned for each i ∈ N as
Bi (N0,C)=ci0i.
The idea of this rule is simple. Agents connect sequentially to the source
following Prim’s algorithm and each agent pays the corresponding connection
cost.
Dutta-Kar’s rule (DK)i sd e ﬁned in a more elaborate way. The agents
connect to the source via Prims’s algorithm, but with a pivotal switch in the
allocation cost at each step. See Dutta and Kar (2004) for a formal deﬁnition.
N o wa s s u m en o wt h a tt h e r ei sm o r et h a no n emt.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eB i r d
rule and Dutta-Kar’s rule can be deﬁned as an average of the trees associated
with Prim’s algorithm.
Dutta and Kar (2004) proceeded as follows. Given π ∈ ΠN they deﬁned
Bπ (N0,C) as the allocation obtained when they applied the previous protocol
8to (N0,C) a n ds o l v e dt h ei n d i ﬀerences by selecting the ﬁrst agent given by








They deﬁned DK (N0,C) in a similar way.
The game theory approach can also be used for deﬁning rules. Bird (1976)
associated a cooperative game (N,vC) with each mcstp (N0,C).L a t e r ,s e v -
eral authors deﬁned rules using this cooperative game. For instance, Granot
and Huberman (1981, 1984) studied the core and the nucleolus, and Kar
(2002) studied the Shapley value.
The Kar rule (K)i sd e ﬁned as
K (N0,C)=Sh(N,vC).
2.3 Properties
We will now introduce several properties of rules. Some of these properties
are known in the literature while others are introduced in this paper.
Given a rule ψ, we consider the following properties:
Core Selection (CS) For all mcstp (N0,C) and all S ⊂ N,w eh a v e
X
i∈S
ψi (N0,C) ≤ m(S0,C).
This property implies that no group of agents would be better oﬀ by
constructing their own network instead of paying what the rule ψ proposes
for each of them. Notice that CS is equivalent to saying that ψ(N0,C) ∈
core(N,vC).
Cost Monotonicity (CM) For all mcstp (N0,C) and (N0,C0) such that
cij <c 0
ij for some i ∈ N, j ∈ N0 and otherwise ckl = c0
kl,w eh a v e
ψi (N0,C) ≤ ψi (N0,C
0).
This property implies that if a particular connection cost increases for
agent i but the rest of the connection costs remain the same, then agent i
cannot be better oﬀ.
9Strong Cost Monotonicity (SCM) For all mcstp (N0,C) and (N0,C0)
such that C ≤ C0,w eh a v e
ψ(N0,C) ≤ ψ(N0,C
0).
This property implies that if a number of connection costs increase and
the rest of connection costs (if any) remain the same, no agent can be better
oﬀ.
Population Monotonicity (PM) For all mcstp (N0,C), S ⊂ N,a n di ∈
S,w eh a v e
ψi (N0,C) ≤ ψi (S0,C).
This property implies that if new agents join a "society" no agent from
the "initial society" can be worse oﬀ.
Continuity (CON) For all N ⊂ N, ψ(N0,·) is a continuous function of
CN.
This property implies that minor changes in agents’ connection costs can-
not lead to major changes in the amount they have to pay.
Positivity (POS) For all mcstp (N0,C) and all i ∈ N,w eh a v e
ψi (N0,C) ≥ 0.
This property implies that agents should not make a proﬁt.
Separability (SEP) For all mcstp (N0,C) and S ⊂ N satisfying m(N0,C)=
m(S0,C)+m((N \ S)0 ,C),w eh a v e
ψi (N0,C)=
½
ψi (S0,C) if i ∈ S
ψi ((N \ S)0 ,C) if i ∈ N \ S.
Two subsets of agents, S and N\S, can be connected to the source either
separately or jointly. If there are no savings when they are jointly connected
to the source, this property implies that agents will pay the same in both
circumstances.
SEP appears in Megiddo (1978), Granot and Huberman (1981), and
Granot and Maschler (1998). They used the name Decomposition.T h e y
studied its relationship with the core and the nucleolus of (N,vC).
10Symmetry (SYM) For all mcstp (N0,C) and all pair of symmetric agents
i,j ∈ N,
ψi (N0,C)=ψj (N0,C).
We say that i,j ∈ N are symmetric if for all k ∈ N0 \{ i,j}, cik = cjk.
Independence of Other Costs (IOC) For all mcstp (N0,C) and (N0,C0),
and all i ∈ N such that cij = c0
ij for all j ∈ N0 \{ i},w eh a v e
ψi (N0,C)=ψi (N0,C
0).
This property implies that the amount paid by agent i depends only on
the cost of the arcs to which he belongs.
Equal Share of Extra Costs (ESEC) Let (N0,C) and (N0,C0) be two
mcstp.L e t c0,c 0
0 ≥ 0.A s s u m i n g c0i = c0 and c0
0i = c0
0 for all i ∈ N,
c0 <c 0
0,a n dcij = c0







This property is interpreted as follows: a group of agents N faces a prob-
lem (N0,C) in which all of them have the same connection cost to the source
(ci0 = c0) and in which this cost is greater than the connection costs between
agents (cij ≤ c0). Under these circumstances, an optimal network implies
that any one agent connects directly to the source, and that the rest connect
to the source through this agent. Moreover, they agree that the correct so-
lution is ψ(N0,C). Assume that an error was made and that the connection
cost to the source is c0
0 >c 0. ESEC states that agents should share this
extra cost c0
0 − c0 equally.
We say that two mcstp (N0,C) and (N0,C0) are tree-equivalent if there
exists a tree t such that, ﬁrstly, t is an mt for both (N0,C) and (N0,C0),a n d
secondly, cij = c0
ij for all (i,j) ∈ t.




11Remark 2.1 Dutta and Kar (2004) deﬁned the property of Tree Invariance.
This property says that the rule must depends only on the set of mt.B o t hB
and DK s a t i s f yT r e eI n v a r i a n c e .
Notice that if a rule satisﬁes IIT it also satisﬁes Tree Invariance. How-
ever, Tree Invariance does not imply IIT. This can be easily checked in
Example 1.1 by taking x =0and x =1 0 0 .
CON, SYM,a n dPOS are standard properties. CS, CM, PM,a n d
SEP already appeared in other papers from the literature on mcstp,w h e r e a s
SCM, IOC, ESEC,a n dIIT are introduced in this paper.
Certain relationships exist between these properties. It is not diﬃcult
to see that SCM implies CM and that PM implies CS. The reciprocal
statements are false.
PM implies SEP.L e t ψ be a rule satisfying PM and S ⊂ N as in
the deﬁnition of SEP.U n d e r PM we know that ψi (N0,C) ≤ ψi (S0,C)
for all i ∈ S and ψi (N0,C) ≤ ψi ((N \ S)0 ,C) for all i ∈ N \ S.S i n c e
m(N0,C)=m(S0,C)+m((N \ S)0 ,C),i ti sn o td i ﬃcult to see that ψ
satisﬁes SEP. The reciprocal is false.
In Section 3 (Proposition 3.5) we prove that SCM implies IIT.
3 The irreducible form
This section is devoted to the study of the irreducible form of an mcstp,w h i c h
already appeared in Bird (1976). The irreducible form has the property that,
if we reduce the cost of any arc, then the cost of connecting agents to the
source is also reduced.
We obtain new results regarding the irreducible form. We also present a
procedure to associate each mcstp with its irreducible form. The procedure
and the new results will be crucial in proving the main results of the paper.
We prove that the Bird rule and the Kar rule coincide in irreducible forms.
This allows us to deﬁne the rule ϕ for a general mcstp as the Kar rule (or
the Bird rule) of the irreducible form of the original problem.
We also study the rules that only depend on the irreducible form. We
prove that they coincide with the rules satisfying IIT. Finally, we obtain
that if a rule does not only depend on the irreducible form, it does not satisfy
SCM.T h i sa l l o w su st oa r g u et h a ti fw ed e c i d et ou s et h ei n f o r m a t i o nf r o m
an mcstp which is not in the irreducible form, we will almost certainly miss
something.
12Given an mcstp (N0,C) and an mt t, Bird (1976) deﬁned the minimal
network (N0,Ct) associated with t as follows: ct
ij =m a x
(k,l)∈gij
{ckl},w h e r egij
denotes the unique path in t from i to j. Bird (1976) used this minimal
network to deﬁne the irreducible core of an mcstp, which is a subset of the
core.
Even though this deﬁnition is dependent on the choice of mt t,i ti s
independent of the chosen t. Proof of this can be found, for instance, in
Aarts and Driessen (1993).
We deﬁne the irreducible form of an mcstp (N0,C) as the minimal network
(N0,C∗) associated with a particular mt t.S o m e t i m e sw ew r i t eCt instead
of C∗ to indicate the mt t.I f(N0,C∗) is an irreducible form,w es a yt h a tC∗
is an irreducible matrix.
Remark 3.1 We see that the deﬁnition of the irreducible form associated
with a particular mt only depends on this mt.H e n c e ,i ft w omcstp (N0,C)
and (N0,C0) are tree-equivalent, we have C∗ = C0∗.
On the other hand, given an mt t in (N0,C), t is also an mt in (N0,C∗).
Hence, C and C∗ are tree-equivalent.
It is well-known that (N0,C∗) is an irreducible form if and only if, by
reducing the cost of an arc, is the cost of connecting agents to the source also
reduced. Thus, we have the following result:
Lemma 3.1 a) For all i,j ∈ N0 there exists an mt t in (N0,C∗) such that
(i,j) ∈ t.
b) For all mcstp (N0,C), C∗ ≤ C.
I nt h en e x tp r o p o s i t i o nw ep r o v et h a ta nmcstp is irreducible if and only
if we can ﬁnd a "linear tree" such that the direct link between two nodes
represents the maximum cost of the arcs that connect them in the linear
tree.
Proposition 3.1 (N0,C∗) is irreducible if and only if there exists a tree t
in (N0,C∗) that satisﬁes the following two conditions:
(A1) t = {(πs−1,πs)}
n
s=1 where π0 =0(the source).
(A2) Given πp,πq ∈ N0 with p<q , c∗







Moreover, t is an mt.
Proof. See Appendix.
13Example 3.1 The following ﬁgures represent an mcstp (N0,C) with N =
{1,2,3} and its associated irreducible form (N0,C∗):
In this case, t = {(0,1),(1,2),(2,3)} satisﬁes (A1) and (A2).
We now introduce a procedure to associate an irreducible matrix C∗ ∈ CN
with each arbitrary matrix C ∈ CN,a n da nmt t that satisﬁes (A1) and (A2).
This procedure will be crucial to most of the proofs of our results.
Let t0 = {(i0,i)}i∈N be an mt in (N0,C) and let π ∈ ΠN. For notational
convenience, we denote π0 =0 .
We say that the nodes in C connect to the source via t0 in the order π
following Prim’s algorithm if t0 is obtained through Prim’s algorithm and





,f o re a c hp. This is the equivalent of
stating that p<qfor all πp,πq ∈ N0 such that πp = π0
q and, moreover, for
each πs ∈ N,
cπ0
sπs =m i n
(p,q)|p<s≤q
cπpπq. (1)
In Example 3.1, the only mt is t0 = {(0,1),(1,2),(1,3)}.M o r e o v e r ,t h e
nodes in C connect to the source via t0 following Prim’s algorithm only in
the order [123].I nC∗ there are several mt, and the nodes can connect to the
source following Prim’s algorithm in the orders [123], [213], [312],a n d[321].
Assume the nodes in C connect to the source via t0 in the order π following
Prim’s algorithm.




qπq ∀s | p<s≤ q. (2)
We deﬁne C0 as follows: for all πp,πq ∈ N0 with p<q ,
c0

















14Proposition 3.2 Given a particular mcstp (N0,C), the matrix C0 obtained
as above is the irreducible matrix associated with C, i.e. C0 = C∗. Moreover,
t = {(πs−1,πs)}
n
s=1 is an mt in (N0,C∗) that satisﬁes (A1) and (A2).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the next proposition we provide three properties of irreducible matrices,
that will be used frequently throughout the rest of the paper. Parts (a) and
(b) are new results. Part (c) is already known.
Proposition 3.3 Let (N0,C∗) be an irreducible form and let π ∈ ΠN be such
that t = {(πs−1,πs)}
n
s=1 with π0 =0is an mt in (N0,C∗) that satisﬁes (A1)




































(c)( N,vC∗) is concave.
Proof. See Appendix.
If we compute the rules K, B,a n dDK in Example 3.1 we obtain K (N0,C)=
(−0.5,6.5,10), B (N0,C)=( 1 0 ,2,4),a n dDK (N0,C)=( 2 ,4,10).M o r e -
over, K (N0,C∗)=B (N0,C∗)=( 5 ,5,6) and DK (N0,C∗)=( 4 ,4,8). Hence,
B and K coincide in this example for the irreducible form. We now prove
that this result holds in general.
Proposition 3.4 If (N0,C∗) is an irreducible form, K (N0,C∗)=B (N0,C∗).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.4 results in the following deﬁnition:




where C∗ is the irreducible matrix associated with C.
15As already mentioned in the discussion in relation to Example 1.1, we
deﬁn et h er u l et h r o u g ht h ei r r e d u c i b l ef o r m . M o r e o v e r ,w ed e ﬁne it as K
and B because the fact that these rules, which are very diﬀerent in general,
coincide in canonical matrices might be of signiﬁcance. In the next section
we will provide more arguments that justify this approach.
We say that a rule ψ depends only on the irreducible form if and only
if ψ(N0,C)=ψ(N0,C∗) for all mcstp (N0,C). In the next proposition we
study this class of rules (notice that ϕ is one of them).
Proposition 3.5 (a) Ar u l eψ depends only on the irreducible form if and
only if ψ satisﬁes IIT.
(b) SCM implies IIT.
Proof. See Appendix.
When we deﬁne a rule through the irreducible form there is certain infor-
mation regarding the problem that we choose to ignore. This may lead us
to wonder whether we might be missing some important information. Our
intuition tells us that this is not the case. On the contrary, we believe that
something is missing when we use information that is not in the irreducible
form. Proposition 3.5 provides a strong argument supporting this. Any rule
that does not depend on the irreducible form does not satisfy SCM either.
From our point of view, an interesting issue is whether it possible to
deﬁne a rule such that: (i)i td o e sn o td e p e n do nt h ei r r e d u c i b l ef o r m ;( ii)i t
satisﬁes good properties; and (iii)n or u l ed e p e n d i n go n l yo nt h ei r r e d u c i b l e
form satisﬁes these properties. In the next section we will see that this is not
a trivial question. In particular, no rule has yet been studied that satisﬁes
(i)-(ii)-(iii).
4 Properties and axiomatic characterizations
In this section we prove that ϕ satisﬁes all the properties stated in the paper
but IOC.I f w e c o m p a r e ϕ with the other rules, it satisﬁes many more
properties.
We also present an axiomatic characterization in irreducible problems and
an axiomatic characterization in the general class of mcstp.
Lemma 4.1 (a) No rule satisﬁes IOC.
(b) ϕ satisﬁes IOC in canonical problems.
16Proof. See Appendix.
In the next theorem we prove that ϕ satisﬁes all the properties mentioned
in the paper but IOC.
Theorem 4.1 (a) ϕ satisﬁes CS, CM, SCM, PM, CON, POS, SEP,
SYM, ESEC,a n dIIT.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the next table we summarize the properties satisﬁed by the above-
mentioned rules. Some of the results for K, B,a n dDK are well-known
in the literature while others can be found in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga
(2004c).
KB D K ϕ
CS no YES YES YES
CM YES no YES YES
SCM no no no YES
PM no no no YES
CON YES no no YES
POS no YES YES YES
SEP no YES YES YES
SYM YES YES YES YES
IOC no no no no
ESEC YES YES no YES
IIT no no no YES
This table clearly shows that ϕ satisﬁes many more properties than the
other rules.
From our point of view, this table contains two kinds of properties. Some
of these properties are what we referred to in the introduction as basic prop-
erties. These are CS, CM, SCM, PM, CON, POS, SEP,a n dSYM.
We call them basic properties because the statements pertaining to these
properties propose the best thing that a fair rule should do in particular
circumstances.
IOC could also be considered a basic property. However, no rule satisﬁes
it.
ESEC proposes a reasonable way to proceed (to divide the extra cost
equally among the agents). However, we do not claim that this is clearly the
best way to proceed. For instance, we may also ﬁnd it reasonable to divide
this extra cost in proportion to what the agents paid before this cost arose.
17IIT is computationally nice in the sense that it makes it easier to compute
the rule. Note that, under IIT, we only need to know an mt in order to
compute the rule.
K, B,a n dϕ coincide in irreducible problems. In general, however, they
are diﬀerent. B and K use information which is not in the irreducible form,
unlike ϕ. A c c o r d i n gt ot h i st a b l e ,K and B do not use this information
correctly as they are missing many properties.
This table, together with Proposition 3.5, would suggest that we should be
careful when deﬁning rules which do not depend exclusively on the irreducible
form.
We now present two characterizations of ϕ.T h eﬁrst only applies to the
subclass of irreducible forms.
Proposition 4.1 In the class of irreducible forms, ϕ i st h eu n i q u er u l et h a t
satisﬁes SYM and IOC.
Proof. See Appendix.
The properties used in Proposition 4.1 are independent. The egalitarian
rule Egi (N0,C)=
m(N0,C)
n for all i ∈ N satisﬁes SYM but fails IOC. BπN,
where πN is the order induced in N b yt h ei n d e xo ft h ea g e n t s( i.e. πN
p <π N
q
if and only if p<q ), satisﬁes IOC but fails SYM.
I nt h en e x tt h e o r e mw ep r o v i d eac h a r a c t e r i z a t i o no fϕ in the class of all
mcstp.
Theorem 4.2 ϕ is the unique rule satisfying IIT, SEP,a n dESEC.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since SCM implies IIT, PM implies SEP,a n dϕ satisﬁes PM and
SCM, the following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 4.1 ϕ is the only rule that satisﬁes SCM, PM,a n dESEC.
Even though Corollary 4.1 is a trivial consequence of Theorem 4.2, we
state it explicitly because we believe that PM and SCM are more appealing
properties than SEP and IIT.









[vC∗ (Pre(i,π) ∪ {i}) − vC∗ (Pre(i,π))]
18for all i ∈ N,w h e r eΠ0
N i st h es u b s e to fo r d e r si nw h i c ht h ea g e n t sw i t ht h e





π ∈ ΠN | c0πq ≤ c0πp when q<p
ª
.
This rule satisﬁes PM (and hence SEP)a n dESEC, but fails IIT (and
hence SCM).
The egalitarian rule satisﬁes SCM (and hence IIT)a n dESEC,b u tf a i l s
SEP (and hence PM).
BπN satisﬁes SCM (and hence IIT)a n dPM (and hence SEP), but fails
ESEC.
5 Other results for ϕ
Kruskal (1956) introduced an algorithm for computing the mt of an mcstp.
Feltkamp, Tijs and Muto (1994) deﬁned the ERO rule through Kruskal’s
algorithm. Initially, each agent has an obligation of 1 and the network is
empty. Applying Kruskal’s algorithm, the obligation of each agent decreases
when for each arc added to the network. This obligation is 1
ni,w h e r eni is
the number of agents linked to agent i. At each step of the algorithm, each
agent pays the proportion of the cost of the additional arc resulting from the
diﬀerence between his obligation before the arc was added, and his obligation
after the arc was added. See Feltkamp et al (1994) for a formal deﬁnition.
In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004d) we proved that ϕ coincides with
ERO. Moreover, two other deﬁnitions of ϕ were presented. In the ﬁrst
deﬁnition we proposed a method for dividing the cost of an mt t among
the agents, taking into account the position of agents in t.W ep r o v e dt h a t
this procedure is independent of the chosen mt, and that the ﬁnal allocation
coincides with that proposed by ϕ.
B and DK assign the whole cost of each arc to one agent following some
speciﬁcp r o t o c o l . T h u s ,w ec a nc o n s i d e rB and DK to be rules assigning
indivisible goods (cost of the arcs). This procedure can lead to unfair alloca-
tions when x is very small, as can be seen in Example 1.1. A classical way of
ensuring fairness in an order-dependent allocation is to take the average over
the set of all orders. In general, this approach is incompatible with eﬃciency.
Nevertheless, if (N0,C) is a general problem, it is possible to generate an ef-
ﬁcient and fair allocation for C by averaging over the orders in C∗.T h i si s
the second deﬁnition in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004d).
Additivity is quite a standard property in the literature of cost allocation.
The natural formulation of additivity in mcstp is ψ(C + C0)=ψ(C)+ψ(C0)
for all C and C0 matrices. This property, however, is very demanding and
19no rule satisﬁes it. Brânzei, Moreti, Norde, and Tijs (2004) and Bergantiños
and Vidal-Puga (2004a) claimed additivity only for some subclasses of prob-
lems. Brânzei et al (2004) characterized ϕ with an additivity property, Equal
Treatment (which is diﬀerent from SYM)a n dUpper Bound Contributions.
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004a) characterized the rule with a similar
additivity property, PM,a n dSYM.
Bird (1976) associated the cooperative game (N,vC) with each mcstp
(N0,C). It should be noted that vC (S) i st h ec o s to fc o n n e c t i n ga g e n t si n
S assuming that agents of N \S are not present. In Bergantiños and Vidal-
Puga (2004e) we associated a diﬀerent cooperative game (N,v+) with each
mcstp (N0,C),w h e r ev+ (S) i st h ec o s to fc o n n e c t i n ga g e n t si nS assuming
that agents of N \ S are already connected to the source. We proved that ϕ
is the Shapley value of (N,v+).
In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b), we proved that ϕ can be obtained
as the equilibrium payoﬀ in a non-cooperative game.
6A p p e n d i x
In this section we prove the results stated in the paper.
6.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We ﬁrst prove that if C∗ and t satisfy (A1) and (A2), then we cannot reduce
t h ec o s to fa na r cw i t h o u tr e d u c i n gm(N0,C∗). We assume wlog that πs = s
for all s =0 ,1,...,n. This means that t = {(i − 1,i)}
n
i=1.





ij.W e n e e d t o p r o v e t h a t m(N0,C0) <m (N0,C∗). It is enough to
prove that there exists a tree t0 such that c(N0,C0,t 0) <m(N0,C∗).
Under (A2), c∗
kk0 = c∗
(i−1)i for some i with k<i≤ k0.W e d e ﬁne t0 =

















Hence, C∗ is irreducible and (A1)-(A2) readily implies that t is an mt.
We now prove that if C∗ is irreducible then there exits an mt t that
satisﬁes (A1)-(A2). We proceed by induction on n (the number of agents).
If n =1the result is trivial. Assume that the result holds for fewer than n
agents. We prove it for n agents.
20We ﬁrst prove that we can ﬁnd an mt that satisﬁes (A1).L e t t0 =
{(i0,i)}i∈N be an mt in (N0,C∗) obtained following Prim’s algorithm.
We can assume wlog that n i st h el a s tn o d ei nt0 that is connected to
t h es o u r c e . B e c a u s eo ft h ed e ﬁnition of Prim’s algorithm we know that
t0\{(n0,n)} is an mt in ((N \{ n})0 ,C∗).S i n c en is a terminal arc in t0,i ti s
straightforward to check that ((N\{n})0 ,C∗) is an irreducible form. Under
the induction hypothesis we ﬁnd some t1 = {(σs−1,σs)}
n−1
s=1 that satisﬁes (A1)
and (A2).M o r e o v e r ,
c
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Let q ∈ {0,1,...,n − 1} be such that σq i st h en o d et ow h i c hn connects
t ot h es o u r c ei nt0, i.e. σq = n0.W et a k et2 = t1∪{(σq,n)}.I ti sn o td i ﬃcult
to see that c(N0,C∗,t 2)=c(N0,C∗,t 0).T h u s ,t2 is an mt in (N0,C∗).
For all p ∈ {q +1 ,...,n − 1}, {(σq,n)}∪{(σs−1,σs)}
p
s=q+1 is the only path
in t2 from n to σp.S i n c et2 is an mt, under the deﬁnition of irreducible forms,
c
∗












We have two cases:
1. r ∈ {q +1 ,...,n − 2} exists such that c∗
σp−1σp ≤ c∗
σqn for all p ∈ {q +1 ,...,r}
and c∗
σqn ≤ c∗








s=1 ∪ {(σr,n)} ∪ {(n,σr+1)} ∪ {(σs−1,σs)}
n−1
s=r+2
is an mt that satisﬁes (A1).
2. Assume c∗
σp−1σp ≤ c∗
σqn for all p ∈ {q +1 ,...,n − 1}. Under (6), it is not






is an mt that satisﬁes (A1).
We have proved that we can ﬁnd some mt t = {(πs−1,πs)}
n
s=1 that satisﬁes
(A1). We now prove that t also satisﬁes (A2).
For all πp,πq ∈ N0 with p<q , it results that g = {(πs−1,πs)}
q
s=p+1 is the
unique path in t from πp to πq. Under the deﬁnition of irreducible forms, it
is not diﬃcult to see that t also satisﬁes (A2).
216.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
We ﬁrst prove that t satisﬁes both (A1) and (A2).
(A1) Trivial.



















Under Proposition 3.1, C0 is an irreducible matrix and t is an mt in C0.
















Hence, t0 is an mt in C0 which satisﬁes that c0
i0i = ci0i for all i ∈ N. By
Remark 3.1, C∗ =( C0)
∗ = C0.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
(a) We compute t0 following Prim’s algorithm in (S0,C∗).S i n c e t satisﬁes
(A2) and s(q − 1) <s(q) for all q ∈ {1,...,|S|} we deduce that c∗
0πs(1) ≤ c∗
0πs(q)




will be the ﬁrst arc in Prim’s
algorithm.






















for all q ∈ {2,...,|S|}.U n d e r (A2), c∗
πs(1)πs(2) ≤ c∗




will be the second arc in Prim’s algorithm.
















(b) Assume ﬁrst p<|S|. Under (a), it is easy to see that













22Since t satisﬁes (A2) we deduce















Under Part (a), it is trivial to see that









(c) This is an immediate consequence of (b).
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Let t = {(πs−1,πs)}
n
s=1 be an mt in C∗ satisfying (A1) and (A2). For all

















[vC∗ (Pre(i,π) ∪ {i}) − vC∗ (Pre(i,π))].
We prove that B = K using an induction argument. If n =1 ,i ti sc l e a r
that B = K. Assume that B = K when there are fewer than n agents.
We prove it when there are n agents. We consider two cases:
Case I There exists an arc (πp−1,π p) ∈ t with p>1 such that c∗
πp−1πp ≥ c∗
0π1.





































= vC∗ (S)+vC∗ (N\S).
23In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004c) we proved that B satisﬁes SEP.




Ki (S0,C∗) if i ∈ S
Ki ((N \ S)0 ,C∗) if i ∈ N \ S.
Since S and N\S have fewer than n agents each, by induction hypothesis
we deduce that B (N0,C∗)=K (N0,C∗).
Case II c∗
0π1 >c ∗
πs−1πs for all s ∈ {2,...,n}.




























ik if j =0
c∗
jk if j 6=0 .
This mcstp is obtained from (S0,C) by considering agent i as the source.
We therefore write S
−i
i instead of S
−i
0 . Moreover, given σ ∈ ΠN,w ed e n o t e
as σ−i the order induced by σ among agents in N−i.
We now proceed with a series of claims.


















N = {σ ∈ ΠN | σ1 = i}.
Proof. Take j ∈ N−i.S i n c e t satisﬁes (A2) and c∗
0π1 >c ∗
πs−1πs for all
s ∈ {2,...,n}, we deduce that c∗
ij <c ∗
0j. By the deﬁnition of Prim’s algorithm,














Note that σ ∈ Πi













































such that s(q − 1) <s (q) for all





is an mt in (S0,C∗).U n d e r( 7 ) ,c∗
0πs(1) = c∗
0π1.




























<m (S0,C∗) − c∗

















. Hence, b t = b ti ∪































= m(S0,C∗) − c∗
0π1.













[vC∗ (Pre(j,σ) ∪ {j}) − vC∗ (Pre(j,σ))].
Proof. U n d e rC l a i m2 ,f o ra l lσ ∈ Πi
N and j ∈ N−i,w ec a np r o v et h a t















But σ ∈ Πi
N if and only if σ−i ∈ ΠN−i. Hence, Claim 3 holds.





∗)=vC∗ (Pre(i,σ) ∪ {i}) − vC∗ (Pre(i,σ)) = c
∗
0π1.
Proof. It is a trivial consequence of (7).
Claim 5 For all j ∈ N, Bj (N0,C∗)=Kj (N0,C∗).

















































for all i ∈ N.T h u s ,Bj (N0,C∗)=Kj (N0,C∗).
256.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5
(a) Let (N0,C) be an mcstp. Assume ﬁr s tt h a tar u l eψ satisﬁes IIT.S i n c e
C and C∗ are tree-equivalent, we have ψ(N0,C)=ψ(N0,C∗).
Assume now that ψ depends only on the irreducible form. Given that
(N0,C) and (N0,C0) are two tree-equivalent problems, we have to prove
ψ(N0,C)=ψ(N0,C0).
Since (N0,C) and (N0,C0) are tree-equivalent problems, there exists some
mt t = {(i0,i)}i∈N in both (N0,C) and (N0,C0) such that ci0i = c0
i0i for all
i ∈ N. Under Remark 3.1, C∗ = C0∗.S i n c eψ depends only on the irreducible
form, ψ(N0,C)=ψ(N0,C0).
(b) If ψ satisﬁes SCM, ψ(N0,C∗) ≤ ψ(N0,C) because C∗ ≤ C (Lemma
3.1(b)). Since m(N0,C)=m(N0,C∗), ψ(N0,C)=ψ(N0,C∗).U n d e r (a),
we conclude that ψ satisﬁes IIT.
6.6 Proof of Lemma 4.1
(a) Let ψ be a rule satisfying IOC.G i v e nN = {1,2}, x>0 and y>0 we
consider the four mcstp represented by the following ﬁgures:
We know that ψ(N0,C1)=( a,−a) for some a ∈ R.S i n c e ψ satisﬁes
IOC, ψ(N0,C2)=ψ(N0,C1),ψ(N0,C3)=ψ(N0,C1)=a, ψ1 (N0,C4)=
ψ1 (N0,C2)=a, and ψ2 (N0,C4)=ψ2 (N0,C3)=−a.T h u s , ψ(N0,C4)=
(a,−a), which is a contradiction because m(N0,C4)=m i n{x,y} > 0.











where iπ ∈ Pre(i,π) ∪ {0} and c∗
iπi =m i n
©
c∗
ji | j ∈ Pre(i,π) ∪ {0}
ª
.
















iπi = ϕi (N0,C
0∗).
266.7 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Independence of Irrelevant Trees (IIT). This is a consequence of Propo-
sition 3.5(a).
Strong Cost Monotonicity (SCM).L e t k,k0 ∈ N0 and Cα,Cβ ∈ CN
such that cα
kk0 = α<β= c
β
kk0,o t h e r w i s ecα
ij = c
β






















and t is an mt in
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N0,Cβ¢









Now assume that for all mt t in (N0,Cα), (k,k0) ∈ t.L e tG be the set of
t r e e sw h i c hd on o tc o n t a i nt h ea r c(k,k0).

























Note that, under our hypothesis, γ>0.
We now distinguish two cases:
Case 1: β − α ≤ γ.L e t t = {(i0,i)}i∈N be an mt in Cα. We can assume
wlog that k0 = k0.S i n c eβ − α ≤ γ,w eh a v et h a tt is also an mt in Cβ.
We will prove the following claim:





(II) t = {(i0,i)}i∈N is an mt in both C1 and C2; and (III) there exists an
order π ∈ ΠN such that the nodes in C1 and C2 connect to the source via t
in the order π following Prim’s algorithm, we have ϕ(N0,C1) ≤ ϕ(N0,C2).
Proof. Assume that k = πr. Let C1∗ and C2∗ denote the irreducible matrices
obtained when we apply the formula (3) to C1 and C2 respectively. Under
Proposition 3.2, t0 = {(πs−1,πs)}
n




































27from which it is easily deduced that C1∗ ≤ C2∗.
Given S ⊂ N and i ∈ S, under Proposition 3.3(b) it is not diﬃcult to
deduce that
vC1∗ (S) − vC1∗ (S \{ i}) ≤ vC2∗ (S) − vC2∗ (S \{ i})
because t0 = {(πs−1,π s)}
n
s=1 is an mt in both C1 and C2 and C1∗ ≤ C2∗.










We use an induction argument. Assume that the nodes in Cα connect to
the source via t in the order π following Prim’s algorithm and k = πn.B y




The induction hypothesis is as follows: assume that the nodes in Cα
connect to the source via t in some order π following Prim’s algorithm and




We now prove this when r = p. Two cases are possible. Firstly, for all




j0j. This implies that the nodes in Cβ also connect
to the source via t in the order π following Prim’s algorithm. Under the Claim






















l0l because the nodes
in Cα connect to the source via t in the order π following Prim’s algorithm
and l ∈ N\Pre(k,π).






Under the Claim, ϕ(N0,Cα) ≤ ϕ(N0,C0).
Let π0 be an order such that π0
s = πs for all s =1 ,...,p− 1,π 0
p = l,a n d
for all s = p +1 ,...,n, π0
s is computed in such a way that the nodes in C0
connect to the source via t in the order π0 following Prim’s algorithm. By
the deﬁnition of C0 and Prim’s algorithm it is straightforward to prove that
we can deﬁne π0 as before.
Since k = π0
r with r>pwe can apply the induction hypothesis to C0 and








Let C00 ∈ CN such that c00
kk0 = α + γ,o t h e r w i s ec00
ij = cα
ij.N o t e t h a t
Cα ≤ C00 ≤ Cβ.M o r e o v e r ,Cα and C00 a r eu n d e rt h eh y p o t h e s i so fC a s e1 ,
and thus ϕ(N0,Cα) ≤ ϕ(N0,C00).
We know that tG is an mt in both
¡
N0,Cβ¢
















Cost Monotonicity (CM).S i n c eϕ satisﬁes SCM we conclude that ϕ also
satisﬁes CM.
Population Monotonicity (PM). W em u s tp r o v et h a tf o ra l lmcstp
(N0,C),a l lS ⊂ N,a n da l li ∈ S,w eh a v eϕi (N0,C) ≤ ϕi (S0,C).I t i s
enough to prove it for S = N \{ k} for some k ∈ N. We assume wlog that
k = n.
We ﬁrst prove the following Claim:
Claim. Assuming c0n = α, cin = β for all i ∈ N \{ n},a n dβ>α>
max
i,j∈N0\{n}
{cij},w eh a v e
ϕi (N0,C)=
½
α if i = n
ϕi ((N \{ n})0 ,C) otherwise.
Proof. Let t be an mt in C and let π ∈ ΠN be an order in which the
agents in N connect to the source via t following Prim’s algorithm. Under
the hypothesis of the Claim, it is clear that n is the last node to be connected
to the source, i.e. n = πn,a n dm o r e o v e r ,t h a t(0,n) ∈ t.
On the other hand, it is clear that t−n = t\{(0,n)} is also an mt in
((N \{ n})0 ,C) and that πN\{n} is an order in which the agents in N \{ n}
connect to the source via t−n following Prim’s algorithm.
Under Proposition 3.2, ˆ t = {(πs−1,πs)}
n
s=1 is an mt in (N0,C∗) sat-
isfying (A1) and (A2). Analogously, ˆ t−n = {(πs−1,πs)}
n−1
s=1 is an mt in
((N \{ n})0 ,C∗) satisfying (A1) and (A2).
Let (N\{n},v −n) be the cooperative game associated with ((N \{ n})0 ,C∗).
Under Proposition 3.3(a), vC∗ (S)=v−n (S \{ n})+α if n ∈ S and
vC∗ (S)=v−n (S) if n/ ∈ S.




v−n (S \{ n}) if n ∈ S
v−n (S) if n/ ∈ S. and
w2 (S)=
½
α if n ∈ S
0 if n/ ∈ S.
29It is not diﬃcult to see that
Shi (N,w1)=Shi (N \{ n},v −n)=ϕi ((N \{ n})0 ,C
∗) if i 6= n,
Shn (N,w1)=0 ,
Shi (N,w2)=0 if i 6= n, and
Shn (N,w2)=α.
Since vC∗ (S)=w1 (S)+w2 (S) for all S ⊂ N, ϕ(N0,C)=Sh(N,vC∗),
and the Shapley value is additive, the result is concluded.
Let α =m a x
i,j∈N0
{cij}+1and β = α+1.L e tC0 ∈ CN be such that c0
0n = α,
otherwise c0
ij = cij.F o r a l l k =1 ,...,n − 1,w ed e ﬁne Ck ∈ CN such that
ck




Take i ∈ N \{ n}.S i n c eϕ satisﬁes SCM,




















(N \{ n})0 ,C
n−1¢
= ϕi ((N \{ n})0 ,C).
Thus, ϕi (N0,C) ≤ ϕi ((N \{ n})0 ,C).
Separability (SEP).S i n c ePM implies SEP, ϕ satisﬁes SEP.
Core Selection (CS).S i n c ePM implies CS, ϕ satisﬁes CS.
Continuity (CON). Clearly, ϕ(N0,C)=( f ◦ g ◦ h)(C) for all C ∈ CN,
where h(C)=C∗ and g(C)=vC for all C ∈ CN,a n df (v)=Sh(N,v) for
all v.S i n c ef, g,a n dh are continuous functions, ϕ is also continuous.
Symmetry (SYM). See Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2004b).
Equal Share of Extra Costs (ESEC).L e t(N0,C) and (N0,C0) be as in
the deﬁnition of ESEC. It is straightforward to check that both C∗ and C0∗
also satisfy the conditions in the deﬁnition of ESEC.M o r e o v e r ,c∗




It is not diﬃc u l tt op r o v et h a tt h e r ee x i s t sat r e et satisfying (A1) and
(A2) in C∗ and C0∗. Hence, for any order π ∈ ΠN, Bπ
i (N0,C∗)=Bπ
i (N0,C0∗)
if i 6= π1, Bπ
π1 (N0,C∗)=c0 and Bπ
π1 (N0,C0∗)=c0
0.





























Positivity (POS).G i v e n S ⊂ N, under Proposition 3.3(b), vC∗ (S) −
vC∗ (S \{ i}) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N. Thus, ϕi (N0,C)=Shi (N,vC∗) ≥ 0.
6.8 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Under Lemma 4.1, ϕ satisﬁes IOC in irreducible forms. Under Theorem 4.1,
ϕ satisﬁes SYM.
We now prove uniqueness. Let ψ be a rule satisfying SYM and IOC.
Let (N0,C∗) be an irreducible form and let t = {(πs−1,πs)}
n
s=1 be an mt
satisfying (A1) and (A2).





ij | i,j ∈ N0
ª¯ ¯.
Let {x1,...,xm} be the m diﬀerent costs in C∗. We can assume wlog that
x1 < ... < xm.W ep r o v et h a tψ is unique by induction on m.
If m =1 ,t h e nc∗
ij = x1 for all i,j ∈ N0. Thus, all agents are symmetric.
Under SYM, ψi (N0,C∗)=ψj (N0,C∗) for all i,j ∈ N.T h u s ,ψi (N0,C∗)=
m(N0,C∗)
n = ϕi (N0,C∗) for all i ∈ N.
Now assume that ψ = ϕ when m<p .W ep r o v ei tf o rm = p.




i ∈ N | c
∗
ij = x1 for some j ∈ N0\{i}
ª
.
We now apply an induction argument to |N0|.
If N0 = {k},w ed e d u c ec∗
0k = x1 and c∗
ik >x 1 for all i ∈ N\{k}.W ed e ﬁne
C0 as c0
0k = x2, otherwise c0
ij = c∗
ij. It is straightforward to check that C0 is an
irreducible matrix. Moreover, for all i ∈ N \{k} and j ∈ N0,c 0
ij = c∗
ij. Under
the induction hypothesis applied to m,w eh a v et h a tψ(N0,C0)=ϕ(N0,C0).







Assume ψ = ϕ when m = p and |N0| <n 0.W ep r o v ei tf o rm = p and
|N0| = n0.F i xk ∈ N0.W ed e ﬁne
Xk = {i ∈ N | c
∗
ik = x1} ∪ {k}.
Clearly, Xk ⊂ N0.W e ﬁrst prove that the agents in Xk are symmetric.











and thus πs ∈ Xk for all s ∈ {r,...,q}.F r o mt h i si ti sn o td i ﬃcult to deduce
that Xk = {πs}
s1
s=s0 for some s0,s 1.M o r e o v e r ,c∗
ij = x1 for all i,j ∈ Xk.





















and hence πq and πr are symmetric.
We deﬁne C0 as follows: c0
ij = x2 if i,j ∈ Xk,o t h e r w i s ec0
ij = c∗
ij.I t i s
straightforward to check that C0 is an irreducible matrix. Moreover, for all
i ∈ N\Xk and j ∈ N0, c0
ij = c∗
ij. Under the induction hypothesis applied to
m (if Xk = N0)o r|N0| (if Xk Ã N0), we have that ψ(N0,C0)=ϕ(N0,C0).
Under IOC, ψi (N0,C∗)=ϕi (N0,C∗) for all i ∈ N\Xk. Since all agents in










6.9 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Under Theorem 4.1, we know that ϕ satisﬁes IIT, SEP,a n dESEC.
We now prove its uniqueness. Let ψ be a rule satisfying these properties.
We apply an induction argument over n.I f n =1 , the result is trivial.
Assume the result holds for fewer than n a g e n t s .W ep r o v ei tf o rn agents.
Since ψ satisﬁes IIT, under Proposition 3.5(a), we can restrict ourselves
to irreducible matrices. Let t = {(πs−1,πs)}
n
s=1 be an mt in (N0,C∗) satisfy-
ing (A1) and (A2).L e tπr ∈ N be such that c∗








321. r>1.T a k e S = {πs}
r−1
s=1. Under Proposition 3.3(a),w ek n o wt h a t
{(πs−1,πs)}
r−1
s=1 is an mt in (S0,C∗) and {(0,πr)}∪{(πs−1,π s)}
n
s=r+1 is
an mt in ((N \ S)0 ,C∗).M o r e o v e r , c∗


















Under SEP, ψi (N0,C∗)=ψi (S0,C∗) when i ∈ S and ψi (N0,C∗)=
ψi ((N \ S)0 ,C∗) when i/ ∈ S.
We know that S 6= ∅ and N \ S 6= ∅ because r>1.U n d e r t h e
induction hypothesis, ψ(S0,C∗)=ϕ(S0,C∗) and ψ((N \ S)0 ,C∗)=
ϕ((N \ S)0 ,C∗).
Since ϕ satisﬁes SEP we conclude that ψ(N0,C∗)=ϕ(N0,C∗).
2. r =1 .L e t p>1 be such that c∗






.C l e a r l y ,
c∗
πp−1πp ≤ c∗
0π1.W e d e ﬁne C0 as follows: c0
ij = c∗
ij if i,j ∈ N and
c0
0i = c∗
0i−α for all i ∈ N,w h e r eα = c∗
0π1 −c∗
πp−1πp ≥ 0.U n d e rESEC,













It is straightforward to prove that C0 is an irreducible matrix satisfying
c0






. Applying Case 1 to C0 we conclude that
ψ(N0,C0)=ϕ(N0,C0). Hence, ψ(N0,C∗)=ϕ(N0,C∗).
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